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Abstract 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) annually procures billions of dollars 
worth of systems, supplies, and services in support of the national military strategy.  
Faced with budget cuts and other resource constraints, the DoD must monitor its 
procurement process to ensure a continuous flow of critical supplies and services. 
One aspect of current transformation in DoD is the use of a strategic sourcing 
approach for the procurement of installation-level services.  Using the Air Force’s 
strategic sourcing process as our context, we develop an optimization model for 
selecting a set of bids among multiple offerors’ proposals for installation services.  
The selection achieves the most favorable objective based on balancing the 
confidence performance level in past performance of the offerors and the cost to the 
Air Force.  The research findings based on a realistic scenario demonstrate 
improvements in both overall performance and cost than the current process.  
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I. Background 
Today’s government agencies are operating in an environment characterized 
by countless economic and political disruptions to their sources of supplies and 
services. In order to survive in this turbulent marketplace, these organizations must 
continually monitor both their competitive position and their internally controllable 
processes—especially the contract management process. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) is no exception. The DoD annually procures billions of dollars worth 
of systems, supplies, and services in support of the national military strategy. The 
DoD Fiscal Year 2008 procurement budget included $388 billion for defense-related 
supplies and services (Government Accountability Office, 2009). Faced with these 
fiscal battles of budget cuts and resource constraints, the DoD must monitor its 
procurement process to ensure a continuous flow of critical supplies and services. 
The DoD procurement process will continue to increase in importance as the DoD 
acquires mission-critical and complex supplies and services.  
The DoD has been undergoing a transformation in terms of how it manages 
its procurement function—to include its people, processes, practices, and policies. 
The DoD’s procurement function is currently transforming from a transaction-
oriented perspective to a strategic-oriented enterprise.  No longer viewed as a 
tactical, clerical, or administrative function, the procurement function is gaining 
enhanced status and importance as leading organizations—including the DoD—
understand and realize procurement’s importance in achieving organizational 
strategic objectives as well as procurement’s impact on competitive advantage. 
Furthermore, organizations are including procurement objectives in the development 
of corporate strategy and have placed great emphasis on developing corporate 
procurement strategies.  One aspect of this transformation is the use of a strategic 
sourcing approach for the procurement of installation-level services.  The Air Force 
has taken the lead in adopting a strategic sourcing approach for the procurement of 
its major installation-level services. 
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Using the Air Force’s strategic sourcing process as our context, this research 
discusses the development and application of an optimization model for evaluating 
and selecting an offeror’s proposal in an optimal bidding, source-selection approach.  
The objective of the research is to show how a pricing optimization (PO) model can 
be successfully used in optimal bidding approaches, in which multiple offerors 
propose at multiple locations.  Specifically, this research applies combinatorial 
optimization to find a set of bids that will achieve the most favorable objective. This 
objective is based on balancing the confidence level in past performance of the 
offerors and the cost to the Air Force. This research is an innovative application of 
operations research to DoD contract management.  
The reminder of this report begins with an introduction to the strategic 
sourcing process, identifying the various contracting phases and discussing strategic 
sourcing contracts.  We then discuss how the Air Force is adopting strategic 
sourcing in its Installation Acquisition Transformation initiative (IAT).  A review of 
optimization concepts will then introduce the PO model and apply it to a simulated 
strategic sourcing, source-selection scenario.  Analysis of results for these scenarios 
is presented.  We conclude with an assessment on the potential use of PO-like 
models in future DoD strategic sourcing source selections. 
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II. Literature Review 
In this exploratory research, we develop a set covering problem for the 
strategic sourcing initiative for contracting in Air Force.  Thus, our literature review 
focuses on these two topics: strategic sourcing and contracting management, and 
the set covering problem from combinatorial optimization.  
Procurement Transformation 
The transformation of the purchasing and procurement function from a 
passive, administrative, and reactive process to a proactive, strategic, boundary-
spanning function was predicted back in the early sixties’ purchasing literature when 
Henderson (1975, p. 44) stated that the procurement function would gain increased 
importance in corporate management. As we begin the tenth year into this new 
millennium, the purchasing and procurement transformation continues to build up 
steam and reap benefits for leading-edge organizations. The procurement 
transformation reflects a new approach to purchasing and procurement that 
embraces the other supply chain management functions of materials management, 
logistics, and physical distribution—this new approach has been labeled "supply 
management" by many organizations and industries (Bhote, 1989).  
This supply management focus requires organizations to adopt a strategic 
orientation to their procurement function and to look more at the total supply chain 
management process and its effect on their organization's competitive strategy. 
More specifically, the supply management focus involves linking the organization’s 
procurement, or sourcing, strategy with its corporate competitive strategy. This 
requires supply managers to become active participants in developing their 
organization’s strategic business plan—which now includes the integration of supply, 
marketing, finance, and conversion strategies (Burt, Dobler & Starling, 2003).  
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Supply management has been described as a new management concept that 
integrates the company's purchasing, engineering, and quality assurance functions 
with the supplier—with each function working together as one team early in the 
procurement process to further mutual goals (Bhote, 1989). Of course, the supply 
function has always existed in all organizations to ensure that all needs are met in 
terms of quality, quantity, delivery, cost, service, and continuity. However, the 
traditional view of supply focused more on the function's operational, or "trouble 
avoidance" contribution to organizational objectives. The new concept described 
focuses on supply management's strategic contributions to organizational objectives, 
such as the opportunistic or profit-maximizing aspects. In addition, this concept of 
strategic supply management differs from the traditional approach in the fact that the 
organization becomes integrated with selected suppliers, working as one team 
toward mutual goals. This concept also differs significantly from the traditional 
adversarial approach to supply management in which suppliers were kept at an 
arm’s-length distance from the organization.  Other major developments in the 
transformation of purchasing to supply management include the breaking down of 
functional walls with the use of cross-functional teams, the development and 
management of supply chains and supply alliances, the use of electronic 
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III. Strategic Sourcing 
Strategic sourcing is probably the most significant aspect characterizing an 
organization’s transformation to supply management. It is also this aspect of supply 
management which provides some of the most value-added benefits to the 
organization. Sourcing, one of the major steps in the procurement process, involves 
the identification and selection of the supplier whose costs, qualities, technologies, 
timeliness, dependability, and service best meet the organization’s needs (Burt et 
al., 2003).  
Strategic sourcing involves taking a strategic approach to the selection of 
suppliers—an approach that is more aligned with the organization’s competitive 
strategy. Strategic sourcing reflects the integration of procurement or sourcing 
strategy with corporate strategy. The integration of procurement and corporate 
strategy is reflective of the transformation of purchasing to supply management.  
One application of strategic sourcing is the use of a commodity sourcing 
strategy—the development and application of a carefully crafted strategy for the 
procurement of quality supplies and services at the lowest cost (Gabbard, 2004).  
The commodity sourcing strategy focuses on developing a specific sourcing strategy 
for a category or group of supplies or services.  It should be noted that the term 
“commodity” should not be associated with traditional commodities such as copper, 
ore, cotton, or barley, nor should it be associated with non-complex supplies or 
services. The term “commodity” is used solely to refer to categories or groups of 
supplies or services. The success of commodity strategies is based on an 
organization’s ability to maximize the cost-reduction advantages of the following: 
leveraging combined buying power for volume discounts, utilizing market experts to 
formulate a sourcing strategy, and finally, forming strong relationships with preferred 
suppliers (Reed, Bowman & Knipper, 2005).  
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Commodity sourcing strategies require a distinct strategy-planning process 
developed for that specific group of supplies or services. Lasseter’s Balanced 
Sourcing Model reflects a generic commodity strategy-planning process involving 
the following seven activities (Lasseter, 1998): (1) Spend analysis, (2) Industry 
analysis, (3) Cost/performance analysis, (4) Supplier role analysis, (5) Business 
process reintegration, (6) Savings quantification, and (7) Implementation. These 
activities are discussed below: 
Lasseter’s commodity strategy-planning process provides an effective 
template for developing a commodity sourcing strategy for a specific group of 
supplies or services. The next section of this research report will discuss the 
application of strategic sourcing and commodity strategies in the commercial 
industry.   
Strategic sourcing strategies have been successfully implemented by IBM 
(Carbone, 1999; Reed et al., 2005), Deere & Co. (Smock, 2001), Lucent 
Technologies, (Carbone, 2002), Cessna Aircraft Co. (Avery, 2003), and Hewlett-
Packard (Carbone, 2004). Each of these world-class purchasing organizations has 
successfully implemented strategic sourcing and commodity procurement strategies 
and has reaped the benefits of transforming its purchasing function to a strategic, 
integrated supply-chain process. Based on these successes, many government 
agencies are now beginning to implement and adopt strategic purchasing best 
practices. The next section will discuss initiatives within the Department of Defense 
to implement strategic sourcing, and specifically, commodity strategies.  
Set Covering Problem 
Set covering problem (SCP) is a classic problem in operations research (e.g., 
Nemhauser & Wolsey, 1999, pp. 6-7).  The SCP hypothesizes a finite set U  and a 
family S  of subsets of U  is given. The goal is to find a minimum-cost subfamily of 
S , referred to as a “cover,” C S , such that the union of all the sets in C  is U .  
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Assuming that each s S incurs a fixed cost ( )c s , the SCP can be formulated as 
follows: 




      (1) 
  subject to  
|
1,s
s S u s
X u U
 
      (2) 
     0,1 ,sX s S       (3) 
In this formulation, equation (1) minimizes the total cost of the cover, (2) 
ensures every element in the original set U is covered by at least one subset in the 
cover, and (3) describes that every subset either is in the cover or not. 
Applications of SCPs abound.  For example, a local government wants to 
establish locations of fire-stations so that all communities are covered with least 
number of fire-stations, which results in lowest fixed cost. This problem—whose 
objective function typically minimizes the number or cost of facilities required—is 
also known as the least-cost, maximal covering problem (Toregas, Swain, ReVelle & 
Bergman, 1971).  
SCP has been extended to problems in which coverage time is used instead 
of distance. A survey of these problems can be found in Church and ReVelle (1974). 
There have been various modifications of this model—as reviewed extensively by 
Marianov and ReVelle (1995)—for emergency services. Drezner (1995) also offers 
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IV. Air Force Initiatives and Processes for 
Contracting 
Just as the commercial sector has experienced success in transforming its 
procurement processes, initiatives are now in place to improve public-sector 
purchasing and procurement processes (Husted & Reinecke, 2009).  As discussed 
at the beginning of this paper, the DoD’s procurement process is currently 
undergoing a transformation similar to the procurement transformation being 
experienced by the commercial sector. This transformation includes changes to the 
DoD’s procurement processes, policies and practices. The strategic sourcing 
initiatives, and specifically the commodity strategy processes, successfully 
implemented by the commercial sector are now being considered and implemented 
by the DoD.  
Many of these transformation initiatives were previously recommended by the 
GAO. Recent reports by the GAO have recommended that the strategic approach to 
procurement taken by the leading companies could serve as a general framework to 
guide the DoD’s services contracting initiatives (GAO, 2002). In addition, the GAO 
also recommended that the DoD adopt the spend analysis best practices 
successfully implemented by the commercial sector, and use the resulting 
information as one of the key elements of implementing a strategic approach to 
procurement (GAO, 2003, June). The GAO also identified key elements of the 
strategic sourcing approach taken by leading companies, which are illustrated in 
Figure 1 (GAO, 2002). Finally, the GAO recommended that the DoD establish a 
management structure that adequately promotes a strategic orientation across the 
departments by setting performance goals—including savings goals—and ensuring 
accountability for achieving them (GAO, 2003, September). 
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Figure 1. Key Elements of Strategic Approach Taken by Leading Companies 
(GAO, 2002, January) 
In response to these GAO reports, as well as other government audits, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a policy memorandum on May 20, 
2005, to federal agencies requiring them to apply strategic sourcing principles to 
maximize the government’s buying power. As stated in the OMB Policy Memo,  
Strategic sourcing is the collaborative and structured process of critically 
analyzing an organization’s spending and using this information to make 
business decisions about acquiring commodities and services more 
effectively and efficiently. This process helps agencies optimize performance, 
minimize price, increase achievement of socio-economic acquisition goals, 
evaluate total life cycle management costs, improve vendor access to 
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The OMB memo also requires agencies to: 
report annually to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) regarding, 
at a minimum, reductions in the prices of goods and services, reductions in 
the cost of doing business, improvements in performance, and changes in 
achievement of socio-economic acquisition goals at the prime contract and, if 
possible, the subcontract level. (OMB, 2005) 
One example of strategic sourcing in the federal government is the US Air 
Force Installation Acquisition Transformation (IAT) program.  The IAT was approved 
by the Secretary of the Air Force in August 2007 to transform “contracting operations 
at all Air Force installations in the continental United States (CONUS) (SAF, 2009).  
The Air Force business case analysis identified the $15 billion annual spend as a 
prime target for strategic sourcing.  Benefits from the IAT strategic sourcing include 
reduction of total cost of ownership, management of consumption, improved 
operating efficiency, and improved focus on socio-economic goals (IAT Industry Day 
Presentation, 2009).   
The Air Force strategic sourcing model can be described using the basic 
contract management process—consisting of procurement planning, solicitation 
planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and contract closeout 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008).  The contract management process is discussed below. 
Contract Management Process 
1.  Procurement Planning:  
This is the process of identifying which organizational needs can be best met 
by procuring products or services outside the organization. This process involves 
determining whether to procure, how to procure, what to procure, how much to 
procure, and when to procure. Procurement planning activities include conducting 
stakeholder analysis, conducting outsourcing analysis, determining and identifying 
requirements and developing related documents, conducting market research, 
selecting the procurement method, and determining the contract and incentive type.   
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The majority of planning for strategic sourcing occurs in the procurement 
planning phase.  In addition to the typical procurement planning activities discussed 
above, procurement planning for strategic sourcing would include a special 
emphasis on reviewing the current procurement strategy for the specific service, 
reviewing past and present business arrangements, conducting a total cost-of-
ownership analysis, understanding industry trends and cost structure, and 
standardizing requirements. 
2.  Solicitation Planning:  
This is the process of preparing the documents needed to support the 
solicitation. This process involves documenting the program requirements, 
competition environment, and identifying potential qualified sources. Solicitation 
planning activities include developing solicitation documents such as draft and 
formal RFPs (Request for Proposal) or IFBs (Invitation for Bid), developing contract 
terms and conditions, and developing proposal evaluation criteria. 
3.   Solicitation:  
This is the process of obtaining information (bids or proposals) from sellers on 
how project needs can be met. Solicitation activities include advertising procurement 
opportunities, conducting industry and pre-proposal conferences, and amending 
solicitation documents as required. 
4.   Source Selection:  
This is the process of receiving bids or proposals and applying evaluation 
criteria to select a service provider. Source-selection activities include evaluating 
proposals, negotiating contract terms and conditions, and awarding the contract. 
This is the key step in our research study. Our efforts are focused on making this 
step of the process more efficient. 
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5.   Contract Administration:  
This is the process of ensuring that each party’s performance meets 
contractual requirements. Contract administration activities include conducting a 
post-award conference, monitoring and managing the contractor’s performance, 
processing contractor requests for payments, and managing changes to the contract 
and related documents.  This phase involves not only managing the contractor’s 
performance, in terms of meeting the cost, schedule, technical, and quality 
requirements of the contract, but also monitoring the internal performance and 
management processes of the acquisition agency.    
6.   Contract Closeout:  
This final phase is the process of verifying that all administrative matters are 
concluded on a contract that is otherwise physically complete. This involves 
completing and settling the contract, including resolving any open items. Contract 
closeout activities include verifying and documenting contract completion and 
compliance with requirements, making final payment, disposing of buyer-furnished 
property and equipment, documenting lessons learned and best practices, and 
collecting contractor past-performance information.  If the service requirement 
continues to exist at the end of the contract period of performance, the procurement 
planning phase is conducted to begin the planning for the follow-on contract. Using 
the contract management process as a backdrop, we will now discuss some specific 
elements of strategic sourcing, such as type of contract and proposal evaluation 
strategy.  
Contract Type 
During the procurement planning phase of the contract management process, 
the type of contract to be used in the procurement is determined.  The Air Force’s 
strategic sourcing procurements typically involve a specific commodity of supplies or 
services (such as medical services, support equipment, or information technology) 
needed at multiple installations across the CONUS.  Because of the level of 
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uncertainty in regards to the delivery and quantity of the needed services at each 
installation, an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) type contract is typically 
used.  This would especially be the case for the strategic sourcing of installation 
services such as grounds maintenance or solid waste management (refuse and 
recycling) services.  As described in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), an 
indefinite-quantity contract provides for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of 
supplies or services during a fixed period. The Government places task or delivery 
orders for individual requirements. Quantity limits may be stated as numbers of units 
or as dollar values. An ID/IQ contract is appropriate when the Government cannot 
predetermine, above a specified minimum, the precise quantities of supplies or 
services it will require during the contract period, and it is inadvisable for the 
Government to commit itself for more than a minimum quantity. The contracting 
officer should use an indefinite-quantity contract only when a recurring need is 
anticipated (FAR, 2009, Part 16.504).  
In addition, according to the FAR, the contracting officer must give a 
preference to making multiple awards of indefinite-quantity contracts under a single 
solicitation for the same or similar supplies or services to two or more sources (FAR, 
2009, Part 16.504(c)).  Multiple-award contracts occur when multiple contracts are 
awarded from one solicitation.  In the private sector, these are known as “bundled” 
awards, and usually involve some quantity discount. Multiple-award, task-order 
contracts (MATOCs) allow the government to procure supplies and services in a 
timelier manner using streamlined contracting procedures.  Use of MATOCs 
leverages the advantage of price competition to obtain optimum prices. The basic 
MATOC typically has a broad scope of work, while the task orders issued under the 
basic contract typically will have a more specific and detailed work statement. 
Proposal Evaluation Strategy 
During the source-selection phase of the contract management process, the 
offeror’s submitted proposals are evaluated in accordance with the basis for 
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evaluation.  The basis for evaluation is determined during the procurement planning 
and solicitation planning phases and is documented in the solicitation.   
The complexity of the source-selection process will depend on the 
procurement method selected.  The source-selection process for a sealed bidding 
procurement will be formal, structured, and very mechanical—with the award being 
made to that responsible bidder whose bid, conforming to the invitation, will be most 
advantageous to the government, considering only price and the price-related 
factors (FAR, 2009, Part 14.408-1).  In this type of source selection, there are no 
discussions or contract negotiations, and the types of contract use is typically firm-
fixed-price, except that fixed-price contracts with economic price-adjustment clauses 
may be used if authorized.   
Negotiated procurements, on the other hand, entail more of an extensive and 
complex source-selection approach, especially if a tradeoff process is used to arrive 
at “best value” decision.  In these types of procurements, the source-selection 
process may include oral presentations, exchanges with offerors (to include 
clarifications and communications), as well as a requirement for submission and 
certification of cost or pricing data.  The FAR describes “best value” as a continuum 
in which the relative importance of cost or price may vary for each specific 
procurement situation.  In some contract source selections, in which the requirement 
is clearly definable and the risk of unsuccessful contract performance is minimal, 
cost or price may play a dominant role.  In other source selections, in which the 
requirement is less definitive and more development work is required (resulting in 
greater performance risk), more technical or past performance considerations may 
play a dominant role (FAR, 2009, Part 15.101).   
The government uses the lowest priced/technically acceptable source-
selection process when best value is expected to result from selection of the 
technically acceptable proposal with the lowest evaluated price.  In a lowest price/ 
technically acceptable source selection, the solicitation provides the evaluation 
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factors and significant subfactors that establish the requirements of acceptability. In 
addition, tradeoffs are not permitted, and proposals are evaluated for acceptability, 
but are not ranked using the non-cost/price factors (FAR, 2009, Part 15.101-2).  The 
contract is awarded to the proposal considered technically acceptable and also 
determined to be the lowest price.  
The government uses the tradeoff process when it is believed that best value 
may be obtained from an “award to other than the lowest priced offeror or other than 
the highest technically rated offeror” (FAR, 2009, Part 15.101).  The tradeoff process 
allows the government the flexibility to award to an offeror anywhere on the best 
value continuum between the lowest priced/technically acceptable offeror and the 
highest technically rated offeror. “This process permits tradeoffs among cost or price 
and non-cost factors and allows the Government to accept other than the lowest 
priced proposal” (FAR, 2009, Part 15.101).  In this type of source selection, the 
solicitation shall clearly state all evaluation factors and significant subfactors that will 
affect contract award and their relative importance.  In addition, the solicitation shall 
state whether all evaluation factors other than cost or price, when combined, are 
significantly more important than, approximately equal to, or significantly less 
important than cost or price (FAR, 2009, Part 15.101). 
Strategic sourcing source selections will typically use a negotiated 
procurement method and a best value trade-off evaluation strategy.  An often-used 
evaluation strategy for installation-level services is the performance price tradeoff 
(PPT) strategy.   
The PPT process is a simplified best-value source-selection strategy that 
permits a tradeoff between price and performance in reaching the award decision.  
In a PPT source selection, the contract can be awarded to an offeror with a higher 
performance rating over a lower performance-rated offeror if the price differential is 
warranted and considered to be best value (USAF, 2008).  Past performance 
information reveals how well the offeror performed work relevant to the type of effort 
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and type of requirement described in the solicitation, and confirms whether the 
performance is current or recent (USAF, 2008).  
A common PPT approach is to first evaluate the offerors’ technical proposal 
on an acceptable/unacceptable basis.  Next, the technically acceptable offerors are 
evaluated for price reasonableness and ranked by total evaluated price. Finally, the 
offeror’s recent and relevant past performance is evaluated resulting in a 
performance confidence assessment rating.  This evaluation process will result in an 
overall performance confidence assessment of substantial confidence, satisfactory 
confidence, limited confidence, no confidence, or unknown confidence.  These 
ratings are described below. 
Rating 1:  Substantial Confidence: Based on the offeror’s performance 
record, the government has a high expectation that the offeror 
will successfully perform the required effort. 
Rating 2:  Satisfactory Confidence: Based on the offeror’s performance 
record, the government has an expectation that the offeror will 
successfully perform the required effort. 
Rating 3:  Limited Confidence: Based on the offeror’s performance record, 
the government has a low expectation that the offeror will 
successfully perform the required effort.   
Rating 4:  No Confidence: Based on the offeror’s performance record, the 
government has no expectation that the offeror will be able to 
successfully perform the required effort. 
Rating 5:  Unknown Confidence: No performance record is identifiable, or 
the offeror’s performance record is so limited that no confidence 
assessment rating can be reasonably assigned. 
If the lowest priced/technically acceptable offeror‘s past performance is rated 
as “substantial confidence” (the highest performance rating), that offer would be 
considered the best value to the government, and that offeror would be awarded the 
contract.  If the lowest priced/technically acceptable offeror’s past performance is not 
rated as “substantial confidence,” then the next lowest price/technically acceptable 
offeror is assessed until an offeror is identified that is rated “substantial confidence” 
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or until all offerors are evaluated.  If stated in the solicitation, the government 
reserves the right to award a contract to a higher-priced offeror if the lower-priced 
offeror(s) has a lower performance confidence assessment.  In the award to a 
higher-priced offeror with a better performance confidence assessment rating, the 
government must decide whether the past performance advantage of that offeror is 
worth the difference in price.  This decision involves a best-value integrated 
assessment documenting the merits of the trade-offs between price and 
performance (USAF, 2008). 
The proposal evaluation process discussed above is quite straightforward and 
noncomplex.  However, in source selections for major strategic sourcing projects, 
the proposal evaluation process can significantly increase in complexity.  This would 
especially be the case in the acquisition of services that are to be performed at 
multiple installations, using a best-value source-selection strategy such as 
performance price tradeoff (PPT), and awarding ID/IQ multiple-award, task order 
contracts (MATOC).   These strategic sourcing procurements present some unique 
challenges.  One challenge is identifying the optimum procurement arrangement 
given the multiple installations, multiple offerors with varying performance ratings 
and different proposal prices for each installation, as well as proposals for 
combination of installations.  In this complex strategic sourcing source selection, the 
use of mathematical modeling will help in identifying the optimum procurement 
arrangement.  The next part of this paper will introduce the PO model and discuss 
the application of the model to a complex strategic sourcing source selection. 
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V. The Problem 
The strategic sourcing for pricing of bids submitted by technically acceptable 
offerors on multiple installations can be modeled as an SCP, described by equations 
(1)-(3) earlier, conveniently adapted for our PO model, as shown later in this section.  
In this case, the universal set consists of all the bids—single, as well as 
multiple contract types—as explained in the previous sections.  For example, 
consider offerors A and B bidding for a certain service to be performed at 
installations 1, 2, and 3. Table 1 lists all the possible bids by these offerors on all the 
three installations. For example, Bid #1 is a bid offered by A on Installation 1 alone, 
whereas Bid #6 is a bid offered by A on Installation 1 and Installation 2, and Bid #7 
offers the same service for the three installations clustered together. There are 14 
such possible bids. However, in reality, all offerors may not bid on all possible bids 
due to their own preference or conditions imposed by the Air Force. One such 
stipulation may be maximum installations allowed to be included in a single bid, 
which is a parameter in our model. The principle underlying this strategy of bidding is 
that the more installations are included in a bid by the offeror, the more the discount 
in price due to, for example, economies of scale or geographic proximity. In other 
words, the sum of individual prices in Bids #1 and #2 for Installations 1 and 2 
individually considered, respectively, is higher than the pricing in Bid #4 for 
Installations 1 and 2 included in a single bid.  More generally, let b denote a bid for a 
group of installations Ib, and let pb be its price.  We assume the following “triangular” 
relationship holds:  
If ' ''b b bI I I  , then, for any offeror bidding for Ib , Ib' , and I b'' , ' ''b b bp p p  . 
Note that, if the above is not true, we may trivially eliminate bid b'' from the pool.  In 
fact, the above may be generalized to mixed contractors and bids such that 
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' ''b b bI I I  .  That is, if offerors A, B and C bid on Ib, Ib′ and Ib′′, respectively, we may 
eliminate the third bid if its price exceeds the sum of the other two. 
Table 1. List of Possible Bids 














14 x x x  
The decision is which bids should be selected in order to achieve the preset 
strategy set by the authority. The strategy might be to choose those bids that enjoy 
the most confidence in performance level (CPL) without any consideration to the 
cost, or the bids that are least expensive with no consideration to CPL. However,  
common sense dictates that in most cases, the strategy will be a compromise 
between these two objectives.  We account for this compromise by incorporating a 
weight as an input to our optimization model. The objective of the model is to 
achieve this preset strategy subject to the fundamental constraint that all 
installations receive the service.  
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We now state the underlying assumptions, based on our discussions with 
subject-matter experts. However, all these assumptions may be adjusted by 
individual program managers as they apply the model.  For example, in the current 
scenario we assume the maximum number of installations an offeror can bid on 
simultaneously is five, but this number could be different for different offerors. We 
make the following assumptions solely for ease in developing the scenarios: 
1. Each offeror bids on numerous bids, but the maximum number of 
installations, n , in a bid is fixed. 
2. All offerors offer the same percentage of quantity discounts that are 
based on number of installations included in the bid.    
3. All installations have the same preference in CPL of the offerors. 
A. Notation 
I   set of installations, for i I  
C   set of offerors (contractors), for c C  
B   set of bids, for b B  
iB B   subset of bids which contain installation i 
bI I   subset of installations in bid b 
bc C   offeror for bid b 
bp   price of bid b [$] 
cv  performance rating of offeror c [rating] (the lower the rating, the 
better the performance) 
w  penalty weight of performance with respect to cost 
[$/performance rating] 
ih  penalty factor to reflect importance of having a good 
performance offeror for installation i [multiplicative factor] 
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B. The Pricing Optimization Model: A Set Covering Problem 
We model our PO problem for optimal offeror and bidding selection as the 




b c i bx b i I
p wv h x








     (5) 
{0,1}bx b      (6) 
The data provided to us did not contain combined bids by any offeror; that is, 
every bid available was exactly for one installation.  For the purpose of this study, we 
have created combined bids by the following process: 
Let: 
cI I   subset of installations for which contractor c places individual 
bids  
cip   price bid by offeror c on installation i, for  ,ci I c C   [$] 
n  maximum number of individual bids in a combined bid (pre-
specified) 
ckr  discount rate offered by offeror c if awarded k installations 
simultaneously 
  
Process: Generate Cluster Bids 
 For each offeror, c C { 
For each 1,2,...,min{ ,| |}ck n I  { 
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    
 { 
 
Add a new bid identifier b (e.g., a bid counter 
index) to set B  
- Generate the lth  (combined) bid b which has 
exactly k installations from Ic 
- Update set Bi for installations in the just-
generated bid 
- Update the cost of the combined bid by using 








}}}   End process 
C. Implementation  
The names of the installations and offerors have been altered to maintain 
confidentiality. This specific scenario for implementing the model has 18 offerors and 
13 installations. The cost of single bids is shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Single Bids 
IA1 IC1 IG1 IK1 IL1 IL2 IL3 IL4 IM1 IR1 IS1 IT1 IV1
OC1 298,565$    1,309,276$ 582,403$ 495,784$ 
OP1 723,485$ 237,556$ 286,125$    917,634$ 1,425,608$ 156,354$ 592,445$ 
OD1 650,125$ 215,445$ 245,369$    925,618$ 1,350,874$ 175,894$ 408,996$    278,996$ 585,226$ 579,446$ 
OS1 921,658$ 225,789$ 424,608$    292,115$ 817,780$ 601,298$ 
OA1 627,569$ 952,325$ 375,000$    262,395$ 587,497$ 
OA2 398,565$    268,975$ 592,668$ 492,961$ 
OM1 932,548$ 364,860$    882,285$ 592,235$ 
OS2
OQ1 456,000$    
OM2 199,064$ 928,546$ 837,601$ 508,556$ 
OC2 825,883$ 
OW1 241,635$    250,976$ 
OS3 925,684$ 832,564$ 
OI1 208,565$ 237,169$    930,584$ 1,625,897$ 250,325$ 850,316$ 658,988$ 602,555$ 
OG1 421,882$    948,687$ 2,148,562$ 985,236$ 
OK1 823,186$ 942,685$ 1,526,512$ 113,274$ 384,509$    265,128$ 905,112$ 602,595$ 548,126$ 
OC3 715,889$ 19,762$   
OC4 585,365$  
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Maximum bids allowed in a cluster are 5 (n) in the current scenario. Discounts 
given by offerors are given in  Table 3. We also assign numerical values to CPL for 
utilizing the mathematical model solely for ease in developing the scenarios. These 
are given in Table 4. 
Table 3. Discounts by Offerors 
Number of Installations in Bids Percentage Discount




For 5 10  





No Confidence 5  
Based on the given category of confidence in performance levels (such as 
substantially confident or not confident, for instance), and the numerical scale 
described in Table 4, each offeror was assigned a numerical value for its CPL. 
These are listed in Table 5. The smaller the value of CPL, the better the confidence 
in the performance level. 
Table 5. Numerical Values of CPL for Offerors  
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OC3 3  
In order to understand the effects of changes in the strategies, we first 
evaluate total CPL (TCPL) and the corresponding cost based on the current 
selection process. Current selection processes (before applying the model) are 
based on two distinct principles. The first process of selection (Selection 1: Lowest 
Cost) chooses the least expensive single bid for an installation with no regard to 
CPL. This process parallels the sealed bidding procurement process or negotiated 
procurement process. The second process of selection (Selection 2: Best CPL and 
Lowest Cost), first chooses the offeror with the best CPL for that installation. If there 
is a tie, it is broken based on the lowest cost.  This selection process parallels the 
PPT approach. Obviously, we do not reckon these as good strategies.  For example, 
using the lowest-cost criterion, if one bid were just $1 higher than another, it would 
not be selected (even if the offeror were highly superior in CPL).  In our example, the 
current selection process has 74 single bids for the 13 installations. 
In order to implement the PO model, multiple bids were generated using the 
“Generate Cluster Bids” process. For 18 offerors and 13 installations (with a 
maximum of five installations in a combined bid), in addition to the given 74 single 
bids, there were 1,535 combined bids. Notice that this number increases rapidly due 
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to bundling opportunities, making the selection process computationally complex 
and justifying the use of our PO model.     
As was described in the formulation of the model, the objective function is to 
minimize cost in addition to incorporating the importance of CPL. Strategies for 
selection of bids depend on importance given by selectors to TCPL and, of course, 
the cost. Therefore, in order to vary the importance of CPL, a weight, , was 
assigned for our test scenarios (as shown in Table 6). For example, given the other 
coefficients in  our optimization model, setting  =100 favors a selection based 
predominantly on cost, whereas  =100,000,000 assigns the most importance to 
CPL.  






Model-Scenario-4 100,000,000  
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VI. Results and Analysis 
Results of the current selection processes are shown in Tables 7 and 8. The 
first selection process yields TCPL of 27, for a cost of $6,512,174. The second 
selection process yields a TCPL of 15, for a cost of $7,261,312. These results show 
that the least expensive strategic sourcing has a total CPL of 27—which translates 
to about an average TCPL of 2 per installation (satisfactory confidence in the 
performance level of the offerors). The second selection process, which prioritizes 
the offeror’s CPL, yields an average TCPL of about 1.15 per installation (translating 
to slightly less than substantial confidence in performance), but this increase in 
confidence occurs at an extra cost of $749,138.  
Table 7. Results from Current Selection Process 1 (Lowest Cost) 
Installation Offeror CPL Cost
IA1 OA1 2 627,569$    
IC1 OM2 3 199,064$    
IG1 OI1 3 237,169$    
IK1 OP1 1 917,634$    
IL1 OC1 1 1,309,276$ 
IL2 OK1 2 113,274$    
IL3 OM1 3 364,860$    
IL4 OW1 1 250,976$    
IM1 OS1 3 817,780$    
IR1 OC1 1 582,403$    
IS1 OD1 1 579,446$    
IT1 OA2 3 492,961$    
IV1 OC3 3 19,762$      
Total 27 6,512,174$   
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Table 8. Results from Current Selection Process 2 (Best CPL and Lowest Cost) 
Installation Offeror CPL Cost
IA1 OD1 1 650,125$    
IC1 OD1 1 215,445$    
IG1 OW1 1 241,635$    
IK1 OP1 1 917,634$    
IL1 OC1 1 1,309,276$ 
IL2 OP1 1 156,354$    
IL3 OD1 1 408,996$    
IL4 OW1 1 250,976$    
IM1 OK1 2 905,112$    
IR1 OC1 1 582,403$    
IS1 OD1 1 579,446$    
IT1 OC1 1 495,784$    
IV1 OK1 2 548,126$    
Total 15 7,261,312$  
Results of the implementation of the PO model in Scenarios 1 through 4 are 
described in Table9. The TCPL ranges from 26 to 14, with the corresponding cost 
varying from $6,090,329 to $6,458,338. 
Table 9. Results of the Model Scenarios 




Model-Scenario-4 14 $6,458,338  
For about the same average confidence in the performance level (satisfactory 
confidence), the solution from the model is cheaper than the current process solution 
by more than $500,000. On the other hand, for the best average TCPL (substantial 
confidence), the solution from the PO model is less expensive than that from the 
current process by almost $1,000,000. It should be noted that the highest cost 
solution from the PO model is cheaper, with better TCPL, than the cheapest solution 
from the current process. The most expensive pricing strategy obtained from the PO 
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model is cheaper than the least expensive pricing strategy obtained from the current 
process. Figure 2 shows the comparison of these strategies. 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of Strategic Sourcing  
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VII. Concluding Remarks 
Strategic sourcing is a strategy for selecting suppliers of supplies or services. 
In this research, we adopted the Air Force’s services sourcing strategy using an 
optimization approach. We discussed and verified that this approach was superior in 
many respects. One, it is an analytical approach that can be replicated and repeated 
for various services acquisitions. The solution obtained by this method is a strategy 
that identifies offerors with high past-performance levels and that costs significantly 
less than the current process. In addition, the researchers developed the 
mathematical pricing optimization model with parameters that can be changed 
based on different situations and that can use realistic data. 
All the parameters and assumptions may be adjusted by individual program 
managers. For instance, as stated earlier in the current scenario maximum number 
of installations an offeror can bid on is 5, but it can be set to any single number or 
the model can be modified to incorporate different ceilings for different offerors.  In 
the current scenario all percentage quantity discounts are the same for all offerors. 
However, realistically, these quantity discounts can be different for different offerors. 
For example, one offeror may offer a quantity discount of 10% for including 5 
installations and the other may offer 12% discount for the same situation. The PO 
model was implemented in a scenario based on the data provided by the Air Force 
for 18 offerors and 13 installations. Out of 1609 bids, the model chose the bids 
based on importance given to TCPL, cost, and a combination of the two. The least-
cost solution would save the Air Force approximately half a million dollars, with no 
change in TCPL. If the Air Force  places more importance on TCPL, using our 
approach will save the Air Forceapproximately a million dollars. 
This method can be expanded in scale to various regions in the Air Force, as 
well as to other DoD agencies such as the Navy and Army. The scope of the model 
in this research was limited to a single agency. Yet, it can be increased to multiple 
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agencies in the future. Another natural extension of this research would be to 
develop a similar model for the strategic sourcing of supplies or specific 
commodities. At present, we are in the process of exploring these venues of 
research and possible implementations.
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Appendix. Acronyms 
CONUS Continental United States 
CPL Confidence in Performance Level 
DoD Department of Defense 
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 
GAO Government Accountability Office
IAT Installation Acquisition Transformation
ID Indefinite Delivery
IFB Invitation for Bid
IQ Indefinite Quantity 
MATOC Multiple Award Task Order Contract
OFPP Office of Federal Procurement Policy
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PO Pricing Optimization 
PPT Performance Price Tradeoff 
RFP Request for Proposal
SCP Set Covering Problem 
TCPL Total Confidence in Performance Level 
WBS Work Breakdown Structures  
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2003 - 2009 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
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Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 
 Budgeting for Capabilities-based Planning 
 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition 
Budgeting Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-tem Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 
 Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness 
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 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 RFID (6) 
 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our 
website: www.acquisitionresearch.org    
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